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DDI-993-74

2 April 1974

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Comments on PFIAB Navy Report

25X1 1. [ ] asked me to review and comment on the PFIAB Navy Report that Admiral Anderson had forwarded to the DCI. The objective was to prepare a short commentary to include in the DCI's briefing book for the 5 April meeting of the PFIAB.

25X1 2. [ ] indicated that he thought we should accept the PFIAB Study for what it was-- a former CNO making recommendations on what the US Government should do to guarantee that we have a navy "second to none". [ ] also indicated that he was satisfied with my verbal comments at this time, in that many of the issues would be raised and debated in the production of NIE 11-15. 25X1

3. I responded that the PFIAB Study is really a US staff paper rather than a net assessment. It reflects the views of the US Navy and particularly the CINCs. It is not objective and in some areas is deliberately misleading. For instance the briefing notes that "While we have been struggling for ten years to develop a new class of high-speed submarine but have not yet put one to sea, they have deployed nine new classes since 1967." This is a classical apples and oranges comparison. The Soviets have built nine types of submarines since 1967 (some of them only slight modifications of other models) but not all were high speed submarines.

4. I told [ ] that I thought some type of response to the PFIAB report was appropriate, but that this was not the proper time or place to take on the U.S. Navy. I would like to come back to the PFIAB briefing and prepare an informal rebuttal. 25X1

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What I propose is to draft a study on the same subject from Gorshkov's point of view. In this way I would not be directly confronting the Navy and PFIAB, but might present the naval balance as the Soviets see it.

5. I was dismayed to note the PFIAB recommendation that NSSM 177 (Missions of Naval Forces) "serve as a base on which our Navy's force structure is planned". Last fall the action officer for this NSSM, Dr. Leonard Sullivan, ASD/PA&E, acquiesced in a proposal that it be killed because of the near impossibility of combining the views of JCS and the services in a single document defining US naval missions. The Naval Operations Branch wasted a considerable number of man-days on NSSM 177 and would prefer not to see it resurrected.



25X1

Acting Chief  
Naval Operations Branch, SR/SF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Messrs. Proctor/Walsh

PFIAB's report to the President on the inadequacies of the US Navy compared to the Soviet's is a gloomy assessment at best. Carver and Graham have the action, but since OSR is involved in support for Colby's 5 April briefing, I have given Knoche a copy.

*wow!*



29 March 1974  
(DATE)

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**Routing Slip**

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Remarks: To 9: Per our conversation, please prepare acknowledgment for DCI's signature.  
 To 8 & 9: Per our conversations, please coordinate re preparation of comments for DCI briefing book for 5 April PFIAB meeting.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 Executive Secretary